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Humane Ethics
and Animal Rights
M.W. Fox
The humane ethic of treating animals
with compassion has been the principle
tenet of the animal welfare movement
for many decades. It is based upon the
Judeo-Christian doctrine of benevolence to all God's creatures and upon
the moral virtue of kindness, inhumanity
being regarded as a social evil and a sign
of bad character.
This ethic, however valid, is limited
because it would seem to accept any
form of animal exploitation if it is done
humanely. Would an explosive harpoon
or instant-kill trap make the slaughter of
whales and fur-bearing mammals morally
acceptable? Within the narrow tenet of
being kind and not cruel toward animals, the answer would be yes.
While the primary goal of the animal welfare movement is to eliminate
suffering in those animal species that
are exploited by humans, this goal, although exemplary, is narrow sighted. Notwithstanding the practical difficulties of
proving animal suffering, especially psychological, suffering could conceivably
be eliminated, as in confined farm animals, through the use of tranquilizers, or
even brain surgery. A goose being made
to eat compulsively, following selective
partial destruction or stimulation of its
brain to cause hypertrophy of its liver
for the liver pate trade, may not suffer.
But it is being harmed. Likewise, to selective breed a farm animal, like a broiler
chicken, that eats to excess and its rate
of growth jeopardizes its health, or to
raise a zoo or laboratory animal in a
highly restricted environment, may not
cause overt suffering, since the animals
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do "adapt." But they are being harmed,
since such treatments can increase their
susceptibility to stress and disease. In
the parlance of animal rights philosophy,
their rights are being violated, regardless
of whether or not suffering occurs or can
be scientifically proven.
Animal suffering, therefore, is only
one aspect of animal exploitation and
abuse. Recognizing this, and the fact
that the elimination of animal suffering
is an extremely limited horizon, the humane movement has greatly expanded
its vision and goals by incorporating
animal rights philosophy and ecological
principles into its educational, legislative,
and political activities.
A deeper understanding of what animals do, and say, and why, will not only
enhance our enjoyment of them as companions or as natural creations for observation and appreciate contemplation;
it will also improve the care they receive
under humane stewardship and under the
dominion of animal researchers, farmers,
and others whose I ivel i hoods depend
upon the exploitation of animals for the
benefit of society. Furthermore, this "animal connection" of understanding is
the basis for informed empathy, as distinct from a purely Cartesian, uti I itarian
anthropomorphic, or esthetic attitude,
which leads us inevitably toward what
Albert Schweitzer called "a reverence
for all life." Once this animal connection of understanding and reverence is
established, the societal recognition of
the intrinsic worth of animals, and of
their rights, will mean a fundamental
change in our attitude toward the animal
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kingdom which will improve our stewardship of planet earth and the lives of all
creatures under our dominion. The
following synopsis of animal rights
philosophy, it relates to the treatment
and exploitation of domesticated and
wild animals, shows where ethical guidelines and ecological considerations are
needed beyond the I im ited framework
of animal suffering per se.
Economic and other social justifications of animal exploitation, particularly
the raising of animals for human consumption and their use in biomedical research, should stand the test of moral, as
well as utilitarian justification, with reference to the ethics of humane animal
exploitation and their intrinsic worth or
"rights" which may be articulated as
follows:
Animals have an intrinsic nature
and interests (needs, wants, etc.) of their
own, intentionality or purposiveness,
and have intrinsic worth independent of
the extrinsic values we may project or
impose upon them. These interests may
be construed as their rights or entitlement;
Their physical, emotional and social needs constitute their intrinsic
nature, or "animalness" (which has an
evolutionary and genetic basis), which
entitle them to just treatment and moral
concern;
In recognizing that animals have intrinsic worth and interests independent
of their extrinsic worth to us, we are
ethically enjoined to treat them compassionately. Thus, when they are under our
care or stewardship, we are morally and
ought legally, to be bound to respect their
rights;
Respecting the rights of animals
means avoiding unnecessary or unjustifiable death, physical or psychological
suffering, or deprivation or frustration of
their basic physical, emotional and social
needs;
Such rights are relative and not absolute (i.e., presumptive). For example, a
domestic animal's desire to be free may
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have to be inhibited for its own good
and for the good of society. However, it
would be a violation of such an animal's
rights (amounting to cruel and unnecessary privation) to keep it continually restrained in a small cage or on a short chain;
To argue that animals have rights is
based on more than philosophical presumption or moral reasoning. It is based
upon the ecological evidence that they
are, as we, an integral part of the biospheric ecological community and also
upon the physiological and psychological
affinities that many animal species have
with us. That we are dominant over them
and in control or superior to them are
not valid reasons for denying animals
equal and fair consideration. The honest
reasons for denying them such consideration, and not according them rights are
primarily economic, and also that their
exploitation gives us pleasure, and that
their interests at times conflict with
ours, as over-competition for resources.
An understanding of the intrinsic nature
of animals leads to an appreciation of
their intrinsic worth and thus ultimately
to according them rights;
The rights of animals should be
given equal consideration with the rights
of a human being, but it is important to
recognize that this does not necessarily
imply equal treatment nor that the interests of the animal are accorded the
same weight or value as essential human
interests;
This provides the ethical basis for
determining when the killing or harming
of an animal (by causing it to suffer or to
be deprived of certain basic needs) is
morally justifiable;
In making such ethical determinations, we as moral agents must consider
the amimal's intrinsic nature and its rights,
and reason informs us that animals are
legitimate objects of moral concern;
Thus, the killing of an animal may
be ethically acceptable only when there
are no reasonable alternatives, as when
the animal is: (a) incurably ill and is ex287
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periencing great suffering; (b) so deformed
or otherwise incapacitated as to be incapable of living without great suffering; (c) endangering the lives of human
beings, or causing a severe and unnatural ecological impact, thus endangering
the lives of other living creatures; (d)
other instances not directly beneficial to
the animal a~ise when its products (meat,
fur, etc.) are essential for human wellbeing and their are no alternatives that are
less costly; (e) when we must minimize environmental costs or suffering of other
animals; (f) or when the knowledge gained
from killing it (as in some biomedical research) is essential for human health or
for the benefit of other animals.
Causing an animal to suffer physically or psychologically is ethically acceptable only when there are no alternatives
and such treatment is essential to human
survival and overall health (as distinct
from purely economic or other materialistic benefit), or promises to alleviate a
significant degree of suffering in man or
in other animals (as in medical or veterinary research);
Subjecting an animal to deprivation
or frustration of certain basic needs is
only acceptable when such treatment is
essential to the welfare of the animal
itself, or essential to the fundamental
welfare of human beings or other animals, and there are no alternatives to using animals to achieve these goals. Fundamental welfare implies consideration
directly relevant to human health, safety and survival, not inessential comforts,
economic benefits, or knowledge for its
own sake;
The rights of animals vary according to the context of their relationship
with human beings. For example, the
right to freedom for a house pet has
more restraints or qualifications than
the right to freedom of a wild animal.
Another example concerns the right to
life of a parasite that is jeopardizing the
life of its host compared to the lives of
members of an endangered species;
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A major aspect of animal rights philosophy which has been seriously overlooked, because of the instant polarization of this issue into animal versus
human rights, is that animals of the
same species, or of the same degree of
sentience, should be treated with the
same degree of humaneness (since they
can all suffer similarly). There are no
moral or ethical grounds for considering
otherwise, and there is certainly no
scientific reason why they should be
treated differently. The only reasons
why similar animals are treated differently are primarily economic;
In sum, the intrinsic nature of an
animal is the basis for rights, from which
the above ethical codes may be deduced.
Nonhuman beings should be as much a
part of our community of moral concern
as humans. They are an inseparable part
of the ecological community of our planet.
The ethical codes are both spiritual and
practical, originating from the highest
tenets of humane, compassionate and responsible conduct. They bespeak a reverence for life, cast within the framework
of ecologically sound and unselfish
planetary stewardship, upon which our
survival depends and through which the
quality and diversity of all life on earth
may be protected and enhanced for the
"greater good";
While the "greater good" cannot be
easily defined for all conditions or circumstances, the concept is framed within
the Kantian formulation that no man
must be the means to the ends of another.
The Talmudic statement: "Whosoever
saves a single life is as if he had saved
the whole world; whosoever destroys a
single life is as if he had destroyed the
whole world" is also relevant to resolving the ethical dilemma where the rights
and sanctity of the individual must be
sacrificed for the "greater", as distinct
from some lesser (e.g., ideological or
economic) good, for the benefit of all,
rather than for the benefit of a select,
more powerful few;
/NT
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The lack of regard and concern for
the intrinsic nature, worth and "rights"
of animals is a metaphor for the lack of
empathy, care, knowledge, respect and
responsibility that humans have for their
own kind, be they of the same or opposite sex, or of a different race, socioeconomic class, political, rei igious or
other belief or value system;
It has been argued that since only
humans can act as moral agents, it is only they and not animals who can have
rights. However, to possess rights, one
need not be an active moral agent, as in
the case of infants and comatose patients. It is logical that since rights constitute a social recognition of other's interests, to deny animals recognition of
their rights is to deny the evidence that
they, like we, have certain interests,
needs, and behavioral requirements. Since
we are moral agents, capable of rational, responsible and compassionate action, it is clearly irrational anthropocentrism to deny other sentient creatures
their rights, recognition of which makes
us more fully human by broadening and
enriching the scope and awareness of
our moral community.
The ultimate tragedy, apart from irreversible environmental destruction
and extinction of species, is not human
and animal suffering so much as the collective atrophy of the human spirit that
permits the unethical exploitation and
subjugation of animals and humans alike,
in the name of economic necessity, political expedience and other inhumane
rationalizations. Social, political and
other reforms, although often well intended, as exemplified by the philosophy, actions and aspirations of animal
and human rights groups, will make little progress until it is realized that social
transformation is possible only when
each individual has become spiritually
enlightened to act responsibly and has
regained the ability to empathize, to
have compassionate understanding and
respect for the intrinsic worth of other
/NT
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